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Introduction
Towards the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s the domi-
nant feature of the economic relations between nations has been the
emergence of international capital movements. Investors abandoned
their traditional confinement to domestic financial markets while, at
the same time, nation states developed some measures in the way of
creating an integrated financial world market. They deregulated fi-
nacial activities by easing cross border controls and lifting some other
restrictive measures.
Such developments have emerged, one way or another, as a re-
sponse to an increasing demand for financial tools. After the recovery of
the nations which had been destroyed in the Second World War world
international trade increased more rapidly than world output. Between
1964 and 1985 world output increased at a rate of 10.4% per year, for-
eign trade increased at an annual rate of 12.4% and the size of gross in-
ternational bank credit increased at an annual rate of 26.1%.1J Such
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high increase in world trade created the problem of financing foreign
trade. Thus nations increased their demand forinternational means of
financing to defy their deficitin current accounts.
Globalization of finacialmarkets has been facilitatedby recent de-
velopments in telecommunications. Thus investors now possess means
of sending commands and transferring theirfunds throughout financial
markets at a very high speed. The set ofintegrated world financialmar-
kets has become a huge system resembling a one-nation market.
Financial globalizationand deregulation of markets resulted in an
increased number of foreign banks in nation states.The second half of
the 1980s witnessed globalizationof financialinstitutionstogether with
the enlargement of financialmarkets. Banks opened up branches in for-
eign countries and the volume of international financial transactions
surpassed that of commodity trade.2'
Fiscal deregulation has had different consequences in different
economies. Despite the factthat nations have resorted to this means of
financing to finance their foreign trade deficits,some of them have de-
veloped even larger volumes of foreigndebt and have thus became more
heavily burdened at the present time than they were before. Turkey,
unfortunately, constitutesone such example. Itis,therefore,interesting
to approach the case of the newly emerging financialmarkets from the
viewpoint of Turkey and assess the results.The important point in this
context is not the financial deregulation itself,but the integration of
thismechanism in the case ofa developing country and its utilizationas
an ordinary financing toolof economic deficits,both internal and exter-
nal.
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The Framework
The main means of regulating financial flows among nations is the
discrepancy between the world interest rate and the rates prevalent in
the different countries. Financial capital, in search of the highest possi-
ble return, is directed towards the region where it collects the highest
return.
The high level of public sector borrowing requirement compared to
the size of financial markets, under fiscal liberalization, results in in-
creased interest rates and a reduced demand for money. Dollarization
and/or shifting to any other sort of financial intermediary other than
the domestic currency aggravates inflation and causes an increase in
the demand for foreign currency. It is therefore self-evident that finan-
cial liberalization aggravates inflation rather than contributes to anti-
inflationary policies.
Financial capital, being quite different from investment capital, is
in the nature of short―term, speculative portfolio capital and one cannot
therefore expect to exert a direct effect on the volume ofinvestments. It
may only be through the interest-effect that such a link may be con-
structed between capital inflow and the volume of investments in a
country.
Despite the fact that finacial capital inflow eases foreign payments
problem during the initial period, in the long run it aggravates foreign
payment problems in two different ways. Firstly, unless the received
capital is not invested to increase the foreign exchange earning capacity
of the economy at a higher rate than that of interest, foreign payment
deficit may even become worse at the period of redemption. In Turkey,
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as in all developing countries with huge internal and external deficits,
received financial capital is mostly used to finance such deficitsinstead
of directing them to material investments. Empirical studies indicate
that financial deregulation has not contributed as much to the total vol-
ume ofinvestments as was expected.31
Secondly, financial capital inflow increases in response to high in-
terest rates at home. Thus accumulated foreign exchange makes the do-
mestic currency overvalued, which impedes exports and fosters imports,
and results in an enlarged foreign trade deficit.In this way, the econ-
omy is pushed into a huge foreign trade deficit,making it necessary for
the country to resort to increased borrowing and resulting in a kind of
vicious circle that cannot be broken by inherent economic forces.
Financial capital inflow is triggered by overvalued domestic cur-
rency and high interest rates fueled by the large volume of public sector
borrowing requirement. The well-known process of hot-money policy is
based on these two factors ; namely, overvalued domestic currency on
the one hand, and high interest rate on state bonds on the other. De-
valuation may be necessary in order to avoid the harmful effects of over-
valued domestic currency on exports. However, such an attempt directs
speculators towards foreign currency abruptly and the tragedy of capi-
tal outflow begins.
Policy makers, therefore, are very unwilling under such conditions
to resort to devaluation because of the threat of immediate capital out-
flow without giving enough time to increase exports to compensate for
finacial capital drainage. Thus a vicious circleis created ; namely, high
PSBR will cause high interest rates, high interest rates will cause fi-
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nancial capital inflow, financial capital inflow will repress foreign cur-
rency parity, thus domestic currency will be overvalued, overvalued do-
mestic currency will cause an increase in imports and a decrease in ex-
ports, increase in imports at a higher rate than the increase in exports
will result in an increased foreign trade deficit,and the surge in foreign
trade deficit will make foreign currency necessary.
Financial liberalization results in currency substitution and dol-
larization in most of the developing countries.41 Currency substitution,
narrowing the inflation tax-base, further aggravates inflation.51 Cur-
rency substitution causes an increase in the volum of foreign exchange
deposits compared to that of domestic deposits. The injection of foreign
exchange into income flow limits the role of the central bank in control-
ling the money base and other monetary variables. The high rate of cur-
rency substitution makes it necessary for central bank to accumulate
an excessively large volume of foreign exchange reserves against the
threat of a sudden shift to foreign exchange by investors.
Large volume of capital inflow leads to steep increases in stock
prices and thus renders the stock market volatile. When a large volume
of financial capital inflow takes place in a relatively shallow stock ex-
change market stock prices increase over their would-be optimum val-
ues, which would be determined by the productivity and profitability of
the companies to which they belong. Such a steep increase in stock
prices not only reflects an artificialjump, it also makes the market very
sensitive to external shocks.61
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Financial liberalization in a country where the volum of PSBR is
very high and shallow financial markets prevail makes it very difficult
for public authorities to realize macro adjustments. An economy under
such conditions becomes exposed and very sensitive to external vari-
ables, and, in most cases, to external shocks.
Currency substitution also exerts a deteriorating effect on real
markets. That the central bank is obliged to keep the interest rate at a
high level in order to prevent the public and financial investors from
shifting to foreign exchange creates a very powerful incentive for capital
owners to substitute financial capital for material investment capital.
In other words, both foreign and domestic investors prefer to enter into
financial markets rather than invest in real markets. Narrowing the
size of real investments and output in the face of high interest rates not
only aggravates inflation due to the relatively small size of the gross do-
mestic product, but also impedes exports by limiting the size of export-
able commodities.
A relatively small size of gross national product on the one hand,
and high interes on the other, make income distribution worse. Owners
of large capital can save their principal and earn high interest income,
whereas wage and salary earners are deteriorated. In other words, in
such an economy wages and salaries will be crowded out by high inter-
est rates.
Last but not least, financial capital is very mobile, which makes it
difficult tolevy tax on this income category. As the share of interest in-
come in national income increases the tax base will be reduced. While
increased inflation together with high interest rates and unequal in-
come distribution make it necessary for the state to increase public ex-
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penditure, the impossibility of taxing this ever-increasing unique factor
income, namely interest income, enlarges the gap between public ex-
penditure and tax revenue. Thus, financial liberalization, through a se-
ries of very intricate and complicated stages, has a deleterious effect on
the national economy and increases public sector borrowing require-
ment.
Causes and Effects of Financial Liberalization in the
Turkish Economy
The beginning of the 1980s constituted a turning point in the Turk-
ish economy, which was then converted from an inward oriented econ-
omy to an outward oriented economy. Several measures were taken in
order to integrate the economy into the world market. Finacial liberali-
zation was one of the measures launched at various different stages at
that time. Until these liberalization measures were put into effect, fi-
nancial repression policy such as taxing financial income and applying
negative interest rates, etc.,were the rule.7'
The very first step was to lift the interest rate ceiling on deposits,
which led to a somewhat cut-throat competition between banks. Ulti-
mately the system was halted by the financial crisis of 1982. Some of
the banks, especially those with small deposit volume and a relatively
weak financial structure became insolvent.
The liberalization of foreign exchange, in the sense that domestic
banks were allowed to accept foreign exchange deposits and foreign
banks were allowed to open up branches in Turkey, was realized in the
beginning of 1984. Following this verv first stet>,controls on foreign ex-
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change were lifted, thus completing full liberalization of capital ac-
counts. However, one last point in this process was the acceptance of
full convertibility of the Turkish Lira, which was realized in 1989.
The financial liberalization measures, which were gradually put
into effect led to a large volume of foreign exchange inflow in the form of
portfolio investment and/or foreign exchange deposits. Such massive
capital inflows were regarded not only as a miracle solution to the bal-
ance of payment problems, but also as a threat to capital outflow in the
future and a brake on the domestic production. The central bank was
burdened by the new function of controlling the tendency of the public
towards currency substitution.
Financial liberalization in Turkey has been perceived as a means of
overcoming foreign trade deficits. As can be seen in column-7 of Table-
1, exports have always lagged behind imports. Despite all economic ef-
forts to get rid of the foreign exchange bottleneck problem from which
Turkey has suffered since the mid-1950s no solution to the problem
was found. Therefore Turkey tried a rather risky way of by-passing this
difficulty by creating a capital account surplus and it has been discov-
ered that the easiest way of creating a capital account surplus is to at-
tract foreign exchange from the enlarged volume of world financial capi-
tal.
There is another reason worth mentioning here for Turkey's at-
tempt to repress the value of foreign exchanre, especially the US dollar
against the Turkish Lira. About 80% of imports consists of investment
goods and industrial inputs. It was therefore inevitable that Turkey
should increase its imports during economic progress in order to obtain
the benefit oflow―cost industrial inputs. Under inflationary pressures,
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Table-1 Some Economic Indicators
undervalued foreign exchange used to import industrial inputs and in-
vestment goods contributes, in its own capacity, to anti-inflationary
policies by keeping prices relatively low. Though it is difficult to specify
the exact degree of the effect of such undervalued foreign exchange pol-
icy, one can say that it has certainly put a brake on rises in the general
price level. However, the difficulty in this policy has been the fact that
the very same policy has led to currency substitution, i. e. dollarization,
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Table-2 Wholesale Price Index and the Index of Values of
Selected Foreign Currencies
which has had a negative effect on anti-inflationary policies. Table-2
makes it evident that Turkey has repressed the value of foreign ex-
change considerably over the last ten years or more. The year 1994 ex-
ceptional insofar as a serious crisis took place then, which resulted in a
tremendous increase in both the value of foreign exchange and interest
rates. Another striking fact in the table is that the Japanese Yen has
gained its normal value over the period. The reason for this divergence
is that only 3-5% of Turkish imports come from Japan and that the for-
eign debt of Turkey is largely on a dollar basis.
The three tables given in the appendix when considered together
reveal one important fact. A gradually increasing public sector borrow-
ing requirement has been the main triggering factor for financial liber-
alization in Turkey. In the second of the 1980s, PSBR began to show an
increase, reaching about 10% at the end of the 1980s. At the same time,
export/import ratio has never risen above 80%, remaining for most of
the period below 70%. The foreign trade deficithas not been eliminated.
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Under these conditions short term speculative capital was thought to be
helpful in coping with both the balance of payments problems and do-
mestic deficits. With this purpose in view, financial liberalzation poli-
cies, together with full convertibility of the Turkish Lira, have been
launched on a gradual basis. As s result, the volume of foreign exchange
deposits increased to about 45% of the total deposits in 1994 from a
level of 24% in 1988. The total volume, including direct short-term
portfolio investments and foreign exchange credits extended by interna-
tional financial circles can be seen in Table-3.
Table-3 Speculative Short-Term Capital Flow and
Some Related Indicators(MillionUS $)
Financial liberalization brought about a change in the role of the
central bank. As mentioned above, the bank began to increase its re-
serves to fulfillits new duty. The central bank must be ready to stop the
public and finacial centers from shifting to the US dollar or any other
foreign currency in anticipation of devaluation and a sudden drop in the
net yield of foreign exchange, especially the US dollar. The large vol-
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ume of dollar reserves held by the central bsnk is a safeguard against
capital outflow. This requirement not only limits the room for manoeu-
vre open to the central bank, but also makes it very costly for the bank
and the economy as a whole.
The most important aspect, and the most tragic one at the same
time, of financial liberalization as realized in Turkey in the 1980s has
been the fact that it has become more difficult for the authorities to gov-
ern the economy. Under such conditions, since capital inflow was not
channelled to productive and foreign exchange yielding investments,
the economy was burdened with ever-increasing foreign deficits.Due to
increasing foreign borrowing the interest payment to foreigners reached
about 2% of GNP in 1995 from a ratio of only 0.2% at the beginning of
the 1980s. This percentage implies, on the average, about one half of
the annual net increase in GNP. In addition to this, interest payments
were made on foreign exchange deposits and foreign exchange loans.
That such short-term portfolio capital inflow made no contribution to
the foreign exchange earning capacity of the economy through in-
creased real investments resulted in high foreign payment deficits,
which increased the need for foreign exchange.
The system exerted an inherently deleterious effect on the economy
without the authorities being able to take any corrective measures. If
the system were left to its own dynamics it would lead the economy to
far-reaching internal and external deficits and shocks. But on the other
hand, if some corrective measures were to be taken, it would merely
hasten the catastrophe. Thus, without any deliberate manipulation, the
economy entered the year 1994 in a very weak and fragile condition. No
effective measures were taken, simply because it was absolutely impos-
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sible.In fact, the government tried to put a brake on the rise in interest
rates in order to stimulate retarded investments. That was the final
cause of the 1994 crisis.Two rating institutions, namely "Standard and
Poors" and "Moody" lowered the credibility rating of Turkey and this re-
sulted in a sudden outflow of portfolio capital from Turkey. The re-
sponse of the policy makers against the drainage of financial capital has
been to increase the interest rates together with the implementation of
a sharp devaluation. The cost of the 1994 crisis to the economy has been
a 6.1% real decrease in the GNP, and an annual price increase of about
150%, let alone a fallin capacity utilization and mass lay-offs.
Financial liberalization has not only weakened the basis of real in-
vestments, but has also aggravated income distribution. As can be ob-
served in Table―1, column―4 in the appendix, interest burden on the
state budget has increased tremendously. The fact that interest accrues
to the relatively rich groups in the economy is a factor which has im-
paired income distribution. Besides, as interest is a cost element, wages
and salaries have been squeezed by high interest costs. Eventually, the
unequal distribution of income gave rise to distortion in consumption
patterns, and contrary to the general belief, the general level of con-
sumption shows a relative rise, which implies deterioration in the gen-
eral level of investments. The result falsifies the McKinnon-Shaw hy-
pothesis, which asserts that removing financial repression will have a
strong positive effect on savings.8'
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Conclusion
The beginning of the 1980s has been a turning point for Turkey. It
was decided then to shiftthe econmy from an inward oriented and pro-
tected system into an outward oriented and liberalizedsetting.The lift-
ing ofrepressive measures on financial markets, referred to as financial
liberalization,has been realized gradually over the 1980s as part of a
general policy change. Financial liberalizationwas put in effectmainly
for two distinctreasons. One of these reasons was rather theoretical.It
was believed in some circlesthat financialrepression is the main cause
of macroeconomic distortionand some main economic problems such as
deficits,trade problems, etc.It was thereforeinevitable, according to
this view, that recourse should be made to financialliberalizationif
such economic disorders were to be avoided.91
The second reason has been the search for a solutionto the state of
heavy indebtedness that Turkey was then in. The advice given by finan-
cialcenters was that Turkey ought to adopt financialliberalizationpoli-
ciesin order to attract capitalinflow and thus ease the foreign trade
problem.
However, the realizationof financialliberalizationdid not contrib-
ute to the solutionof the main economic problems, as was expected, but
led to perverse resultsin the economy as regarded both allocative and
distribututiveefficency.The findings may be summarized as follows :
- Financial liberalizationdid not increase totalsavings as expected.
Though fixed capitalformation, taken as an indicator of savings poten-
tialof the economv. increased from 19.6% in 1980 to around 24% to-
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wards the end of the 1980s, such an increase cannot compensate for the
budgetary loss and other problems sttributable to financial liberaliza-
tion.
- Financial liberalization resulted in currency substitution, which
became a widely used practice, especially in the second half of the 1980s.
The percentage of foreign exchange deposit in total deposit showed a
huge increase from 24% in 1980 to 46% in 1994.10)
- Dollarization aggravated inflationary pressure on the economy,
while exerting a negative effect on anti―inflationary policies by provid-
ing a means of hedge against inflation to the newly injected currency.
However, as the volume of dollar currency grew, the threat of inflation-
ary pressure on the economy increased.
- The lifting of the restrictions on fiscalinstruments resulted in an
increase in interest rates and the increase in nominal interest rates re-
sulted in short-term speculative portfolio capital inflow. Capital inflow,
while being of some help in solving short-term balance of payments
problems, aggravated foreign payment issues by causing overvaluation
of the domestic currency. As a result of the revaluation of the Turkish
Lira, exports decreased, while imports grew. As can be seen in Table-1,
column―7 in the appendix the export/import ratio showed no improve-
ment in favor of exports throughout the period. One reason for this was
the undervaluation of foreign currency, which can be traced in Table-2
in the appendix, without fostering exports it is impossible to improve
the foreign exchange earning capacity of economy and to cure foreign
trade deficits.Keeping the value of foreign exchange repressed thus cre-
ates a vicious circle of trade deficit-caDital inflow―repressed or unser-
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valued foreign exchange-and again trade deficit.
- Financial liberalization exposes finacial markets to artificial
shocks, thus making them vulnurable. High interest rates, together
with overvalued domestic currency, is a combination of policieswhich
yields very high nominal return on speculative capital.Rate of return
on hot money increased by up to 29% in 1990, as can be seen in Table-3.
The capitalinflow thus attracted makes it necessary for the central
bank to hold high foreign exchange reserves in order to be able to keep
the rate of foreign exchange at reasonable levels if a capital outflow
should take place. Since nominal return on one unit offoreign exchange,
e. g. the US dollar,depends on both interest rates and overvalued do-
mestic currency, any threat of devaluation causes an abrupt decrease in
the nominal return on foreignexchange, thus causing capital outflow.It
is thereforenecessary a large volume offoreign exchange reserves must
be held by the central bank in order to meet a period of crisiswithout
causing a steepincrease in the interestrate.
- Uncontrolled capitalinflow also causes finacialbubbles in securi-
ties markets. Under inflationary pressures, people become more in-
clined to take high risks and bid higher pricesfor financialinstruments.
But when a downturn of the cycleappears, everything gets even worse.
Financial bubble creation is very dangerous, especially when markets
are too shallow. Creating financialinstabilitycan undermine the pro-
ductive efficiencyof the system.111
- Financial liberalizationand subserience to the increased role of
the pricingmechanism without developing any supervisory system and/
or having an efficientand appropriate market structure leads to finan-
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cial disaster. It is therefore necessary to resort to financial liberaliza-
tion not as a meaus of curing instability, but just the reverse, as a
mechanism which can function efficiently only under conditions where
macroeconomic dynamics are in good shape and a certain level of devel-
opment has been attained.
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